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STAYING IN HOLLYWOOD AND THE BIG 
APPLE: THE EFFECTIVENESS AND 
DESIGN OF FILM PRODUCTION TAX 
CREDITS IN NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA 
Tina Xu 
Film production tax credits have become an increasingly 
common feature of the state tax system. These tax credit 
programs were originally a response to worries about 
“runaway production” of films to foreign jurisdictions offering 
similar incentives. Now, even states with a historical 
comparative advantage in film production and strong in-state 
talent and expertise offer sizeable tax credits. 
This Note will focus on the film production tax credits 
offered in states with a historical comparative advantage in 
filming, specifically New York and California. The Note 
begins by examining the evolution and expansion of the 
Empire State Film Production Credit and the California 
Film and Television Production Credit. Then, it compares the 
current design of these two tax credit programs, and discusses 
and critiques economic impact analyses used to evaluate these 
programs. The Note concludes by addressing whether it is 
advisable for a state with a historically strong film industry 
to offer a film tax credit, and which tax design features are 
appropriate for such a state, paying special attention to how a 
program determines eligibility for the tax credit, whether the 
credit can be refunded or transferred, and the credit’s 
allocation mechanism. 
 
 J.D. Candidate 2017, Columbia Law School; B.A. 2014, University of 
Toronto, Trinity College. Many thanks to Professor Alex Raskolnikov for 
his indispensable guidance and feedback. Additional thanks to the 
exceptional staff and editorial board of the Columbia Business Law Review 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, forty states offer film industry tax 
credits,1 including those states with a historical comparative 
advantage in filming and an in-state talent base for 
production. In 2004, New York adopted its own program, 
which it later expanded to offer a refundable 30% tax credit 
for qualified production and post-production costs, 75% of 
 
1 Adrian McDonald, Down the Rabbit Hole: The Madness of State 
Film Incentives as a “Solution” to Runaway Production, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 85, 86 (2011) (discussing the popularity of state film production tax 
credits). 
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which need to be incurred in New York State.2 In 2009, 
California’s Governor Schwarzenegger signed an economic 
stimulus package that included a transferable tax credit of 
up to 25% of production costs if a 75% in-state threshold, 
similar to New York’s, is met.3 
These tax credits received a varied reception in tax law 
and tax economics literature, with little consensus on which 
incentive design features are most efficient or effective and 
which states are best suited to tax credits.4 This Note focuses 
on tax programs in New York and California, states that 
have a historical comparative advantage in film production. 
This comparative advantage may be attributed to factors 
that are exogenous to a strong entertainment industry such 
as temperate climate and identifiable landmarks, as well as 
endogenous factors like an existing large talent pool of 
production professionals. 
This Note addresses whether states that have a 
comparative advantage in film production should offer tax 
credits. Part II provides a background of the development of 
the film production tax credit programs in New York and 
California. Then, Part III aggregates and compares existing 
empirical data to measure the effectiveness of California and 
New York’s respective programs with respect to marginal 
increases in film production and any multiplier effect that 
extends to other areas of the economy. It also addresses the 
 
2 Eric Homsi, Comment, Financing Films One State at a Time: A 
Survey of Successful Film Incentive Programs, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 149, 160–62 (2011) (outlining New York’s Empire State Film 
Production Credit). 
3 Michael H. Salama, State Film Tax Incentives and the Related 
Potpourri of Federal Income Tax and Tax Accounting Considerations, 62 
TAX LAW. 1085, 1088, 1090 (2009) (explaining the inception of California’s 
film production tax credit). 
4 See McDonald, supra note 1; Homsi, supra note 2; Salama, supra 
note 3; Paul Battista, “Runaway” Film and Television Production: Carrots, 
Sticks, & International Tax Reform, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 243 
(2014); David A. Hughes, State Film Tax Incentives: Which Plan Works 
Best When There Are So Many from Which to Choose?, 23 J. MULTISTATE 
TAX’N & INCENTIVES 6 (2013). 
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significance of the popularity of tax credit programs in other 
states and countries on programs in New York and 
California. Part IV presents policy recommendations by 
identifying which tax credit design features should be 
employed in a state that has a historically robust film 
production industry to maximize marginal increases in film 
production. It examines what films ought to be eligible for 
the tax credit, whether credits should be transferable or 
renewable, and what allocation method is appropriate. The 
Note then concludes in Part V. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FILM PRODUCTION TAX 
CREDIT PROGRAMS 
Since the 1990s, popular news and academic literature 
has drawn attention to “runaway production,” where foreign 
jurisdictions such as Canada offer tax incentives to lure film 
and television production away from historically popular 
movie-making destinations like California and New York.5 
State legislatures responded to the threat of foreign tax 
incentives with their own state film tax credits. Louisiana 
was the earliest adopter of film tax incentives in 1992; by 
2010, over forty states were offering some form of tax credit 
for filming in state.6 
A. New York’s Empire State Film Production Credit 
New York legislators first enacted the state’s film tax 
credit, the Empire State Film Production Credit (“ESFPC”), 
in 2004.7 The program initially offered a 10% tax credit, 
 
5 Battista, supra note 4, at 266 (discussing the evolution of film 
production tax credits offered in Canada). 
6 Hughes, supra note 4, at 8 (2013) (discussing the increasing number 
of states offering film production tax credits). 
7 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., REPORT ON THE EMPIRE STATE 
FILM PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 1 (2008), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/ 
stats/policy_special/film_production_credit/report_on_the_empire_state_fil
m_production_credit_september_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6X4-2WUH] 
[hereinafter 2008 N.Y. STATE ESFPC REPORT]. 
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limited to $25 million per year, and was scheduled to end in 
2008.8 In 2006, legislators expanded its annual cap to $60 
million.9 Despite the cap increase, ESFPC faced a precipitous 
78% drop in applications from the year ending July 2006 to 
the year ending July 2007.10 The Governor’s Office for 
Motion Picture and Television Development, the body 
responsible for administering the tax credit, attributed the 
significant drop to “aggressive” newly instated tax credit 
programs in Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and 
Pennsylvania, as well as to uncertainty in the labor market 
because of potential Writers’ Guild strikes.11 The legislative 
response involved further amendments to the ESFPC in 
2008, which included increasing the tax credit rate to 30%, 
extending the program to 2013, and gradually increasing the 
budget annually from $60 million in 2008 to $110 million in 
2013.12 Additional allocations of $350 million for 2009 and 
$420 million annually from 2010 to 2014 were approved in 
2009 and 2010 respectively.13 
Some of the tax credit design aspects of the ESFPC have 
stayed largely the same since its inception. The original 2004 
program made feature length films, television films, pilots, 
and series eligible, and required that 75% of film production 
facility expenditures be spent at a “qualified film production 




10 Id. at 16–17. 
11 Id. at 15. 
12 Id. at 1. 
13 Homsi, supra note 2, at 161. 
14 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., REPORT ON THE EMPIRE STATE 
FILM PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 1 (2006), https://tax.ny.gov/pdf/stats/policy_ 
special/film_production_credit/report_on_the_empire_state_film_productio
n_credit_march_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BVW-FDK8]. A “qualified film 
production facility” means “a film production facility in New York State, 
which contains at least one sound stage having a minimum of 7,000 
square feet of contiguous production space,” with certain additional 
requirements applicable to facilities used by non-independent film 
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75% test, qualified production costs incurred at a qualified 
film production facility, generally consisting of below-the-
line15 items “for tangible property or services used or 
performed within New York directly and predominately in 
the production” of a qualified film, could be included in the 
calculation of the tax credit.16 Qualified expenditures spent 
outside the qualified facility but within New York State 
related to pre-production may also qualify depending on total 
New York expenditures or percentage of location days in 
New York.17 These eligibility requirements, including the 
75% test and qualifying costs, are structured similarly in the 
current-day ESFPC. 
Two key changes to the ESFPC have significantly 
changed incentives for film producers. First, the tax credit 
now preferences film production in upstate New York, and 
the elimination of a municipal tax credit in New York City 
compounds the effect of this preference.18 Since 2005, New 
York City had offered an additional city tax credit of 5% for 
films predominantly shot and produced within the five 
 
production companies. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 5, § 170.2(z) 
(2006). 
15 “Above-the-line” and “below-the-line” are terms of art used in film 
production. Generally, “above-the-line” refers to the cost of a “producer, 
director, writer, and principal talent,” which are “often fixed fees.” “Below-
the-line” refers to “everything else, including atmosphere, talent, 
technicians, equipment, location costs, and film stock.” GREGORY GOODELL, 
INDEPENDENT FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION: A COMPLETE GUIDE FROM 
CONCEPT THROUGH DISTRIBUTION 72 (3d ed. 2003). 
16 2008 N.Y. STATE ESFPC REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
17 Id. 
18 N.Y. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION 
DEVELOPMENT, NEW YORK STATE FILM TAX CREDIT PROGRAM GUIDELINES 2 
(2015), http://esd.ny.gov/businessprograms/Data/Film/2015/FilmCreditGui 
deline_rev_1142015.pdf [https://perma.cc/V879-FMX9] [hereinafter 2015 
N.Y. STATE ESFPC GUIDELINES]; Kristoff Grospe, Behind the Scenes of the 
City’s Media and Entertainment Office, CITYLAW, Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 47 
(2012). 
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boroughs,19 but this “Made in NY” city tax credit expired 
without renewal in 2009.20 In contrast, the latest iteration of 
the state tax credit program offers an additional tax credit of 
at least 5% for post-production costs incurred outside of the 
Metropolitan Commuter Transportation District.21 
Second, the post-production tax credit now has its own 
budgetary cap and unique design features. While post-
production costs were included in the definition of “qualified 
costs” in the original 2004 program, the 2010 amendments 
required 75% of post-production costs be incurred in New 
York State,22 and also created a separate post-production 
credit for projects where filming occurs out of New York 
State but post-production occurs in state.23 In 2012, the post-
production tax credit was increased from 10% to 30%, with 
an additional uplift for projects in upstate New York.24 The 
focus on post-production in the upstate region may be an 
attempt to draw a certain segment of the industry to a part 
 
19 Joshua R. Schonauer, Note, Star Billing? Recasting State Tax 
Incentives for the “Hollywood” Machine, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 395 (2010) 
(explaining that the credit was available “for any qualifying film project 
that shoots at least 75% of its production in any of the five boroughs of 
New York City”). 
20 Grospe, supra note 18, at 47. 
21 2015 N.Y. STATE ESFPC GUIDELINES, supra note 18, at 2. Film 
production in certain counties in upstate New York will be rewarded with 
a 10% additional tax credit on qualified labor expenses. Id. 
22 HR&A ADVISORS, INC., ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE NEW 
YORK STATE FILM PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 5 (2012), http://www.mpaa.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Economic-and-Fiscal-Impacts-of-the-New-Yo 
rk-State-Film-Production-Tax-Credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH5W-8BTT] 
(report commissioned by the Motion Picture Association of America). 
23 MARILYN M. RUBIN & DONALD J. BOYD, NEW YORK STATE BUSINESS 
TAX CREDITS: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 36 (2013), http://www.capital 
newyork.com/sites/default/files/131115__Incentive_Study_Final_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4PB-CLTT] (report prepared for the New York State 
Tax Reform and Fairness Commission). 
24 Jonathan Randles, NY Extends Tax Credits for Post-Production 
Film Industry, LAW360 (July 24, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
363527/ny-extends-tax-credits-for-post-production-film-industry [https:// 
perma.cc/H7GW-KTN3]. 
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of the state that traditionally has not been an entertainment 
powerhouse. 
B. California’s Film and Television Production Credit 
California adopted a film production tax credit program 
fairly late compared to New York and nearby states like New 
Mexico, perhaps because it was more immune to the threat 
of runaway production due to a storied history of film 
production in Hollywood. In early 2009 during the depths of 
the recession, former actor and then-Governor 
Schwarzenegger approved a film production tax credit as 
part of an overall economic stimulus package.25 However, the 
2009 California Film and Television Production Credit 
(“California I”) was not the first film incentive program 
sponsored by the state. In 2000, the legislature enacted the 
Film California First program, which reimbursed certain 
filming costs incurred in state.26 This program was more 
akin to a direct subsidy than a tax credit. That being said, 
subsidies and tax credits are functionally similar, insofar as 
both programs “reimburse” production companies for filming 
in California, albeit with the Film California First program 
offering reimbursement for limited number of expenses.27 
While the Film California First program was defunded in 
2003,28 it shows that the 2009 Film and Television 
Production Credit was not the first instance when the state 
government responded to the threat of runaway production. 
Many aspects of the California program are similar to the 
New York program. The 2009 program had a budget cap of 
 
25 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.85(b)(15)(A) (West 2010). See also 
Richard Verrier, California Budget Includes Tax Relief for Film, TV 
Shoots, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/20/ 
business/fi-filmtaxcredits20 [https://perma.cc/47L2-Y68A]. 
26 Ashley Lavon Hines, Chapter 10: Run Home to Hollywood! Run to 
California!, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 759, 761 (2010). 
27 Id. (noting in addition that a $300,000 cap per production existed 
for such reimbursements). 
28 Id. at 762. 
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$100 million a year, with a total five-year cap of $500 
million, and was scheduled to end in 2014.29 Like New York, 
California has a 75% threshold test for films, which can be 
met either by having 75% of principal photography days take 
place in California or 75% of the production budget be spent 
in California.30 Depending on the type of production in 
question, a tax credit of 20% or 25% is available, with the 
more generous tax credits offered to independent films and 
to television series willing to relocate to California.31 A 
qualifying film also must fit into one of several prescribed 
categories, some of which have minimum or maximum 
budget requirements.32 A project that meets the 75% test and 
fits within one of the prescribed film types can apply for a 
tax credit for qualified expenditures, which consist of 
expenditures in California for purchase or lease of personal 
property, wages, and services performed in California.33 Like 
in New York, above-the-line expenditures, including 
payment for writers, directors, music directors, composers 
and supervisors, producers, and actors other than 
background actors are not considered qualified expenses 
eligible for tax credits.34 
California legislators amended the program in 2012 to 
extend through 2017, with yearly caps remaining at $100 
million and a total program cap of $800 million in tax 
credits.35 Then in September 2014, instead of merely 
 
29 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23685(i)(1)(A) (West 2010). 
30 Id. § 23685(b)(15)(B)(i). 
31 Id § 23685(a)(4). The program further specifies that a relocating 
series must film all of its prior seasons or its only prior season outside of 
California. Id. § 23685(b)(22). 
32 Id. § 23685(b)(15). For example, in order to qualify for the tax 
credit, “feature films” are subject to a minimum $1 million budget and a 
maximum $75 million budget. Id. § 23685(b)(15)(A)(i). 
33 Id. § 23685(b)(16). 
34 Id. § 23685(b)(18)(B) (excluding such expenditures from the 
definition of “qualified wages,” a term within the definition of “qualified 
expenditures”). 
35 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23685 (West 2012). 
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extending the term of the program, Governor Brown signed a 
bill substantially expanding and renewing the tax credit 
program.36 The new program, later billed as the California 
Film and TV Tax Credit Program 2.0 (“California II”), 
increased the cap to $330 million annually,37 expanded 
eligible film types,38 included an allocation mechanism to 
prioritize projects that create the most and highest-paying 
jobs,39 and included an uplift for projects that shoot or have 
other qualified expenditures outside the Los Angeles thirty-
mile zone.40 
Comparing the evolution of these two programs in states 
that traditionally dominate film production in the United 
States suggests that film tax credits are politically popular, 
and perhaps necessary, responses to other states’ tax credit 
programs. In both New York and California, the programs 
have expanded dramatically over time, with an over fifteen-
fold budget increase in New York,41 and an over two-fold 
 
36 Brian Bardwell, California Governor Approves Film Credit 
Expansion, ST. TAX TODAY, Sept. 19, 2014, at 1, LEXIS, 2014 STT 182-4. 
37 Id. See also Kurt Orzeck, Calif. Gov. Agrees To Boost Film, TV Tax 
Credits By $230M, LAW360 (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/571736/calif-gov-agrees-to-boost-film-tv-tax-credits-by-
230m?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.cc/VC8S-VT63]. 
38 This includes: eliminating the feature film budget maximum and 
instead making only the first $100 million eligible, allowing TV shows to 
be licensed for any distribution outlet (including the internet) as opposed 
to only basic cable, and allowing a project that moved from California to 
another state that moves back to California to qualify as a relocating TV 
series. CAL. FILM COMM’N, CALIFORNIA FILM & TELEVISION TAX CREDIT 
PROGRAM 2.0 GUIDELINES 2, 3 (2015), http://film.ca.gov/res/docs/pdf/ 
Incentives%20Documents/CFCGuidelines%202%200%20November%20%2
0Revised%2011-3-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPV5-K2LP] [hereinafter CAL. 
FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015]. 
39 Cal. Film Comm’n, California Film Commission Announces First 
Round of TV Projects Approved for Expanded Tax Credit Program, ST. TAX 
TODAY, June 3, 2015, at 106, LEXIS, 2015 STT 106-26. 
40 Id. 
41 See 2008 N.Y. STATE ESFPC REPORT, supra note 7, at 1; Homsi, 
supra note 2, at 161 (explaining changes in the budget caps). The 
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budget increase in California.42 The expansion, and even the 
continued existence of these programs during times of tight 
state budgets, especially in the case of California,43 is a 
testament to the political support that exists, especially in 
these states where the entertainment industry is an 
important constituency. Both programs have also gradually 
incorporated additional incentives for filming outside of the 
traditional film industry strongholds of Hollywood, the 
greater Los Angeles area, and the greater New York City 
area.44 Trying to draw film production or post-production 
outside of those metropolitan areas is more akin to programs 
incentivizing production in an area without a history of 
movie production, like New Mexico or Louisiana have tried 
to accomplish, than trying to retain production in a 
traditionally popular filming locale. Politics, rather than 
efficient tax design, could also be motivation for the zone 
incentives. New York City and Los Angeles are already hubs 
for a myriad of industries, whereas areas like upstate New 
York were hit harder by the recession and see slower job 
growth.45 Zone incentives may make film tax credits 
 
calculation used is as follows: ($420 million – $25 million)/$25 million = 
1580% increase in the ESFPC’s budget. 
42 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23685 (West 2010); Bardwell, supra 
note 36, at 1, for changes in the budget cap. The calculation used is as 
follows: ($330 million – $100 million)/$100 million = 220% increase from 
California I to California II. 
43 See Martin Zimmerman et al., California Budget Crisis Could 
Bring Lasting Economic Harm, L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2009), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2009/may/23/business/fi-cal-econ23 [https://perma.cc/ 
JD4G-MT7G]. 
44 California increases the tax credit rate by 5% for qualified 
expenditures outside the Los Angeles zone. New York increases the tax 
credit rate by 5% when production occurs in “Upstate New York,” and by 
10% when production occurs in specified counties upstate. See also infra 
Appendix, Table 1, Size of Credit and Preference Zone sections. 
45 Jesse McKinley, Cuomo Struggles to Maintain Momentum in 
Upstate Employment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/11/07/nyregion/cuomo-struggles-to-maintain-momentum-in-upstate-
employment.html?_r=0. 
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politically palatable to constituencies outside of the 
metropolitan areas home to the entertainment industry. 
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF FILM PRODUCTION TAX 
CREDIT PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK AND 
CALIFORNIA 
This Note uses the following criteria to evaluate and 
critique the efficacy and design of film production tax credits: 
(1) the return on investment (“ROI”) to the state in the form 
of tax revenue; (2) the broader ROI to the economy, including 
direct, indirect, and multiplier effects; (3) job creation 
measured by the number of jobs created per million dollars of 
spending; (4) efficiency of the program and whether there are 
unintended distortions to the economy; (5) fairness and the 
potential for gaming; and (6) administration and presence of 
transaction costs. 
Policymakers and politicians may be more likely to use 
criteria (1) through (3) in evaluating the potential return on 
adopting a tax credit program. In addition, criteria (4) 
through (6) offer a more holistic approach to evaluating the 
design of such a program. 
A. A Detailed Comparison of the Programs 
Table 1 (found in the Appendix) describes the film 
production tax credit programs in both states. It matches up 
their criteria for ease of comparison. Details for the 
California I and California II programs are included since 
there are some major design changes and the empirical 
study discussed below is based solely on the California I 
program. Only details for the 2015 New York program are 
included because the program has not changed substantially 
from the data collected for the Camoin study discussed 
below. 
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B. Comparing Empirical Studies 
Both the New York and California tax credit program 
statutes require an impact analysis of the effectiveness of 
their respective film production tax credit programs.46 
However, depending on the choice of parameters and 
software used, economic models measuring the impact of the 
same tax credit in the same time period can come to different 
conclusions.47 This Part of the Note reviews the two most 
recent studies of the New York and California programs and 
discusses the conclusions and shortcomings of the analyses. 
The Southern California Association of Governments 
commissioned the Los Angeles County Economic 
Development Corporation to complete the most recent 
empirical study on the California Film and Television Tax 
Credit in 2014 (“LAEDC study”).48 This study evaluates only 
the California I program described above; data is not yet 
available for the California II program, since projects served 
by the latter program have not yet finished production. The 
LAEDC study utilizes data from 2009 to 2013, tracking the 
first three fiscal years of the California I program. During 
this time period, 113 eligible projects received tax credit 
allocations, but only 109 projects received their final tax 
credit certifications and could be included in LAEDC’s 
 
46 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 38.9 (West 2014) (requiring the California 
Legislative Analyst’s Office (“LAO”) to report on the economic effects and 
administration of the film tax credit program); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 5, § 170.12 (2014) (requiring the New York Department of 
Economic Development to file a biennial report including “an economic 
impact study prepared by an independent third party of the film credit 
programs”). 
47 See, e.g., Eric Yauch, Results of Industry’s Film Credit Study Differ 
From State Study, ST. TAX NOTES (Apr. 13, 2015), at 97, LEXIS, 76 State 
Tax Notes 97. 
48 LOS ANGELES COUNTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
CALIFORNIA’S FILM AND TELEVISION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: ASSESSING ITS 
IMPACT (Mar. 2014) [hereinafter LAEDC], http://laedc.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/03/SCAGFilmReport_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VX33-
ZEZE]. 
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analysis.49 Following the release of this study, California’s 
Legislative Analyst’s Office, a non-partisan fiscal and policy 
monitor, offered their observations of California I and a 
critique of the LAEDC study, some of which are incorporated 
in the comparison below.50 
In New York, Camoin Associates, an outside consulting 
group commissioned by Empire State Development, released 
an impact analysis in March 2015 (“Camoin study”). This 
study covers a two-year program from 2013 to 2014. The 
Camoin study separates out results by the production credit 
and the post-production credit, and neglects to provide the 
impact analysis per dollar of tax credit. Accordingly, this 
Note attempts to weigh the production and post-production 
credit impacts and provide a rough measure of the overall 
effect of the program.51 It also provides a per-dollar 
calculation to make the New York and California studies 
comparable despite differences between the two studies.52 
Both the California and New York studies try to measure 
the economic impact of the state film production tax credit 
program by measuring the direct impact of the production 
credit, and extrapolating the indirect impact on the economy. 
The LAEDC study uses models and software developed by 
IMPLAN Group, LLC,53 whereas the Camoin study uses a 
model designed by Economic Modeling Specialists, Intl.54 
 
49 Id. at 7. 
50 MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, FILM AND 
TELEVISION PRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY AND 
STATE TAX CREDITS (2014) [hereinafter LAO], http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
reports/2014/finance/tax-credit/film-tv-credit-043014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
CYC8-UZ2W]. 
51 This Note also provides the unaggregated data for clarity and 
comparison. 
52 This Note uses the discounted present value in the New York 
calculations, as the LAEDC does. 
53 LAEDC, supra note 48, at 16. 
54 CAMOIN ASSOCS., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FILM INDUSTRY IN NEW 
YORK 12 (2015) [hereinafter CAMOIN], http://esd.ny.gov/Reports/Report 
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Both of these models are regularly used input-output models 
that can estimate the ripple or multiplier effects of a policy 
throughout a complex local economy.55 The “total economic 
impact” measured includes (i) direct effects, consisting of the 
first round of spending (such as wages paid to production 
employees or costumes purchased), (ii) indirect effects, 
consisting of spending throughout the supply chain, 
including spending by suppliers down the chain (such as the 
wardrobe supplier that buys from the fabric supplier that 
buys from the cotton producer), and (iii) induced effects, 
which arise out of spending by those employed by the 
production company and the suppliers.56 Jennifer Weiner 
explains that these models “capture how increases in film 
production expenditures ripple through the rest of the state’s 
economy” by relating “spending in one sector . . . to spending 
in other sectors.”57 She stresses that even studies produced 
by the same software can have discrepancies in magnitude 
depending on the calibration of the model, which is generally 
not described in detail, a problem that “plague[s] most tax 
credit evaluations.”58 These models rely on geographically 
specific data critical to inter-industry analysis. For example, 
the inter-industry linkages are likely much stronger in New 
York and California than they would be in jurisdictions that 




55 See Duanjie Chen, The Framework for Assessing Tax Incentives: A 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Approach 21 (Apr. 23, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015 
TIBP_PaperChen.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5J7-TMD6]. 
56 See id. at 12; LAEDC, supra note 48, at 16; CAMOIN, supra note 54, 
at 25. 
57 JENNIFER WEINER, NEW ENG. PUB. POLICY CTR. AT THE FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF BOS., MEMORANDUM ON ERNST & YOUNG ANALYSES OF NEW MEXICO 
AND NEW YORK FILM TAX CREDITS 2, 3 (2009), https://www.bostonfed.org/ 
economic/neppc/memos/2009/weiner040209.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q269-
9QZD]. 
58  Id. at 3. 
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credit, because supply chains are much more likely to remain 
exclusively in-state. Table 2 presents a comparison of the 
New York and California programs. 
 






















$0.65 $0.49 $0.49  $0.42  













$19.12 $8.76 $8.81 $7.48 
 
59 All figures in this column are found in the LAEDC study, LAEDC, 
supra note 48, at 9, with the exception of ROI to State per dollar tax 
credit, which uses the LAO estimate to provide a figure directly 
comparable to the Camoin New York studies. LAO, supra note 50, at 23. 
60 All figures in the remaining three columns are found in the Camoin 
study, CAMOIN, supra note 54. 
61 ROI is defined differently in various studies. Compare LAEDC, 
supra note 48, at 1 (assessing “state and local tax revenue per dollar 
credit”), with CAMOIN, supra note 54, at 22 (combining tax collection of 
New York state, New York City, and all other New York local government 
tax collection, discounted to net present value). 
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$71,749 $55,346 $55,337 $55,362 
Qualifying 
expendi-




63.2%64 N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
62 The calculation is as follows: 22,300 jobs/$230.4 million. LAEDC, 
supra note 48, at 1 (providing the 22,300 jobs figure). 
63  The calculation is as follows: Labor income/jobs. It is unclear in the 
LAEDC study if a “job” is defined annually if it is long-term. If a “job” can 
last longer than a year, then this overestimates the average income per 
job. The Camoin study defines a “job” as “one person employed for some 
amount of time (part-time, full-time, or temporary) during 2013 or 2014” 
and states that “if a person is employed full-time in 2013 and 2014 that 
would be considered two jobs.” CAMOIN, supra note 54, at 12. 
64 The calculation is as follows: (1.2/1.9)*100%. LAEDC, supra note 
48, at 1 (providing the $1.2 billion and $1.9 billion figures). 
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Comparing these two analyses, California’s tax credit 
produces better metrics in all categories above. However, in 
terms of fiscal impact, neither the California nor the New 
York film production tax credit program is revenue-neutral 
for the state government, with California coming out slightly 
ahead of New York. In both cases, the state government loses 
revenue by offering the program. That being said, once ROI 
to city governments through tax revenue and ROI to the 
state government through non-income and sales tax 
measures are included in the analysis, all of the programs 
other than the New York post-production credit have positive 
returns. This suggests that the film tax credit programs 
functionally provide transfer payments from state to local 
governments. Municipal governments capture the economic 
benefits of these tax credit programs without having to fund 
them.65 
On measures of economic impact, directly comparing the 
two studies ($19.12 in California versus $8.76 in New York) 
suggests the California program produces more than double 
the economic output per tax credit dollar.66 The data also 
suggests California produces more than double the labor 
income per dollar tax credit. One wonders how much the 
LAEDC study’s extremely impressive positive results are 
attributed to the assumptions made by the authors or the 
calibration of the models, and how much they are attributed 
to the historic and present strength of California’s film 
industry. 
The LAEDC study attributes the success of the California 
program both to the design of the tax credit and the 
comparative advantages that already exist in the state. It 
 
65 See BOS. CONSULTING GRP., THE MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT 
INDUSTRY IN NYC: TRENDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 9, 26 
(2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/film/downloads/pdf/bcg-report-10.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7N5Y-S4U5] (finding empirical data that supports the 
finding that the “NY state tax credit remains a key enabler for production 
in NYC” and qualitative data that suggests there is an abundant talent 
pool in the state that is supported by the state tax credit). 
66 See supra Table 2. 
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claims that the “overriding factor” that determines the ROI 
is “the proportion of expenditures made in California that 
qualify for credits.”67 Broadly speaking, this likely does not 
explain the differences between New York and California 
because both tax credits are statutorily designed to only 
include below-the-line tax credits, and the proportion of 
above-the-line to below-the-line expenses is unlikely to vary 
state to state. The other potential cause for variance of the 
proportion of qualified expenditures to direct expenditures is 
the amount of above-the-line expenses incurred in state. If 
this were a primary cause for the variance, it would suggest 
that many more above-the-line workers (e.g., actors, 
producers, and directors) live in California rather than New 
York. This also seems unlikely to be a huge difference since 
anecdotally movie stars choose to reside in both in the Los 
Angeles and New York City areas in large numbers.68 
The other factors the LAEDC study cites as contributing 
to California’s tax credit’s strong performance are a well-
established film industry, a large and diversified state 
economy, relatively progressive income taxes, and film tax 
credits that are less generous than other states.69 California 
has more than half the U.S. motion picture production 
employment, compared to New York’s slightly less than 
quarter,70 which suggests that the strength of supplier 
networks and the film industry in California would be 
greater––resulting in a greater multiplier effect per dollar of 
tax credit and less leakage in spending to other states. As 
well, California’s tax credit offered a 20% to 25% tax credit 
whereas New York offers a 30% tax credit.71 This too may 
explain why California’s tax credit measures as more 
 
67 LAEDC, supra note 48, at 1. 
68 See BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 65, at 7 (listing as one factor 
that leads to productions filming in New York City the likelihood that the 
lead actor or director lives in New York City and prefers to film locally). 
69 LAEDC, supra note 48, at 8. 
70 LAO, supra note 50, at 10. 
71 See supra notes 12, 31 and accompanying text. 
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efficient. The other two rationales would not seem to apply to 
a California/New York comparison. New York also has a 
similarly large and diversified state economy, and is also a 
location where those who work in the entertainment 
industry would want to live, buy property, and spend their 
earnings. Also, New York’s income taxes are fairly 
comparable to California’s.72 
Given that differences between the states are unlikely to 
account for all or even many of the differences in measured 
efficacy of tax credit programs described above, perhaps 
methodology of analysis can explain the differences. The 
methodological concerns and differences between the 
California and New York studies are discussed below. 
C. Critique of Empirical Studies 
These impact analyses are useful in comparing variations 
between state programs and help explain trends in the film 
industry. However, they may be flawed in their research 
query. State-commissioned studies are influenced by what 
sorts of analyses are feasible, what data is measurable, and 
what is politically palatable. The LAEDC study produced an 
impact ratio described as “measur[ing] the economic and 
fiscal impacts in terms of the current dollar value of the 
discounted tax credit certificates issued.”73 From a fiscal 
perspective, the study claims “for each dollar of tax credit 
certificate issued, $1.11 was returned to local and state 
governments, which is the real rate of return on the 
investment of public funds.”74 Some of the academic policy 
 
72 See Shan Li, California Second Only to New York in High Taxes, 
Study Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/ 
mar/20/business/la-fi-mo-taxes-states-20140320 [https://perma.cc/R8Y6-
B534] (“Those living in the Golden State shell out about $9,509 for state 
and local taxes, 36% more than the national average. New York residents 
pay $9,718, or nearly 40% more than what people pay on average in the 
country.”). 
73 LAEDC, supra note 48, at 1. 
74 Id. 
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analysis argues state and municipal revenue should be 
considered equivalent, since tax dollars are going into a 
collective public purse.75 However, from the perspective of 
state legislators, municipal tax revenue is different from 
state tax revenue. The California Legislative Analyst’s Office 
(“LAO”) criticized the LAEDC’s $1.11 ROI figure as an 
overstatement of the fiscal impact because the figure 
includes “local tax revenue, fees for services, and payments 
for unemployment benefits”; it noted that the disaggregated 
measurement of “sales and use tax, personal income tax, 
corporation tax, and other tax revenue the state receives or 
that directly reduces state costs” yielded a ROI of $0.65.76 
Arguably, since the state government provides the tax credit, 
the measure of ROI should only include funds that return to 
the state government entity as tax revenue. Tax revenue 
flowing to municipal government entities highlights the 
positive multiplier effects arising from state tax policy, but 
should not be included in the state’s calculation of its costs or 
benefits arising from the credit. On the other hand and 
consistent with the California LAEDC study, the Camoin 
study from New York also includes tax revenue to New York 
City and other New York state municipalities in its widely 
cited ROI of $1.09 per dollar of tax credit.77 
A more analytically accurate inquiry into ROI demands 
considering the opportunity cost of a film production tax 
credit. The question ought not be how much is returned to 
the state government in tax revenue per tax credit dollar, 
but rather, what would the fiscal rate of return be for each 
dollar on an alternative project if the state government were 
 
75 See e.g. FLA. OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, RETURN 
ON INVESTMENT FOR THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
33–34 (2015), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/returnoninvestment/Entertain 
mentIndustryIncentivePrograms.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT7A-VAAR] 
(discussing and critiquing the practice of including local revenues). 
76 LAO, supra note 50, at 23. 
77 CAMOIN, supra note 54, at 23. Camoin provides disaggregated 
measures in their study, id., making it easy to compare their figures to the 
LAEDC and LAO figures. 
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not allocating it to a film tax credit?78 To frame it another 
way, the comparison should be between the ROI of film tax 
credits and the ROI offered by other potential projects, 
especially that of the next best alternative. The rationale 
behind this is that if it were not for the film tax credit 
program, the money allocated to those programs would be 
allocated to a different program. Both the California and the 
New York state constitutions require the governor to submit 
a balanced budget.79 This means that in order to offer the tax 
credit, the state government must “either cut spending or 
increase other taxes to offset the loss in tax revenues,” which 
would be “likely to have negative effects that offset the 
economic benefits of the credit . . . .”80 Those negatives 
include a multiplier impact, because “[u]nder a common 
budget constraint, the revenue loss from a given tax 
incentive program must be offset by a spending reduction or 
tax increase outside of such a tax incentive program; such a 
spending reduction or tax increase can have a negative 
multiplier impact on the economy.”81 For example, if 
sponsoring a film production tax credit entails shutting down 
a tax credit for another industry, some of the jobs in that 
industry may be lost and income taxes paid would be 
reduced. This dilemma exists even if one believes these 
 
78 See FLA. OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, supra note 75, 
at 30 (“A recurring criticism of proponent studies is the failure to factor 
opportunity costs in the economic analysis.”); LAO, supra note 50, at 24 
(noting that California could have funded another state program instead of 
the film production tax credit, and “any alternative funding decision would 
have created economic benefits through an economic multiplier effect. This 
is important because it is possible that an alternative funding decision 
could have a greater economic benefit than the film tax credit.”). 
79 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: 
STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 3 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/doc 
uments/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
K2MN-H2J6]. 
80 WEINER, supra note 57, at 3. 
81 See Chen, supra note 55, at 11 (“It is, however, uncommon to see 
policy makers acknowledge the negative multiplier impact of the revenue 
loss from tax incentives.”). 
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programs are revenue-neutral; the opportunity cost of these 
programs may still be above zero if there are, for example, 
industries in which one could get a better fiscal rate of 
return per dollar of tax credit. Furthermore, tax credits incur 
costs and require financing in the short term, whereas the 
fiscal return is spread out over time.82 
Beyond the ROI, these empirical analyses consider the 
benefit to the state economy as a whole. Studies refer to this 
as a measure of the “economic output per dollar of tax 
credit,” sometimes referred to as the impact ratio, or even 
more euphemistically as a measure of the amount that total 
economic activity in the state increased by for each dollar of 
tax credit certificate issued.83 These labels are misleading 
because they assume that, but for the tax credit, the film 
production company would not have chosen to locate its 
production in the state.84 The LAEDC study, while making 
this assumption explicit, claims that “[t]he loss of production 
activity to other states and nations in response to competing 
incentives lends support to this assertion.”85 This is simply 
not an accurate counterfactual, especially in historical 
hotbeds of film production such as California and New York. 
While it may be appropriate to make such an assumption for 
a state that has little history of attracting film production, 
there are plenty of reasons for a film production company to 
choose to film in New York or California besides their tax 
credits, not limited to the availability of a deep talent pool, 
specialization of labor, existing advanced facilities for post-
production, existing relationships with vendors, and the 
 
82 WEINER, supra note 57, at 3. 
83 LAEDC, supra note 48, at 9. 
84 Id. at 17 (“In this analysis, as in other studies, the return on 
investment is calculated based on the assumption that the projects that 
qualified for tax incentives and received allocations would not have taken 
place in California in absence of those incentives.”). 
85 Id. 
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multitude of scripts that are actually set in one of the two 
states.86 
This assumption is certainly not limited to the LAEDC 
study. Weiner explicitly criticizes Ernst and Young’s 2009 
impact analysis of New York’s ESFPC program for assuming 
that “the film projects receiving credit assistance were 
actually induced by the credits,” while pointing out that 
other studies make some attempt to differentiate between 
production that would have occurred even in the absence of 
the film credit and that which was induced by the film 
credit.87 The Camoin study tries to distance itself from the 
problematic but-for assumption discussed above. In 
discussing methodology, it claims that unlike a previous 
study, they use a “more conservative” approach and “only 
include[] the spending by productions that received the tax 
credit and can be reasonably assumed to have been induced 
to New York State as a result of access to the credit 
program.”88 While Camoin should be commended for its 
effort, there are few details provided as to how the study 
achieved this conservative approach. 
It is extremely difficult to untangle causation in 
macroeconomic models, especially when the implementation 
and design of film production tax credits are themselves 
likely endogenous variables. There may be confounding 
factors that impact a legislature’s decision to enact or expand 
a film tax credit program, which also affect a film production 
company’s decision to film in a particular jurisdiction. If that 
is the case, the legislature is likely to misattribute an impact 
to the tax credit if the outside factor is not controlled for, and 
it is difficult to control for all these potential confounding 
variables, especially in an interconnected macro economy. 
The 2007–2008 Writers Guild strike illustrates this 
 
86 See WEINER, supra note 57, at 3; Jennifer Carr, Film Tax Credit 
Studies Fail to Deliver on Big Promises, ST. TAX NOTES, Apr. 7, 2014, at 29, 
LEXIS, 72 State Tax Notes 29. 
87 WEINER, supra note 57, at 3. 
88 CAMOIN, supra note 54, at 6. 
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phenomenon. The strike and its surrounding uncertainty 
may have been factors suppressing film production in the 
late 2000s,89 which in turn may have contributed to the 
implementation of the film tax credit program in California 
or the expansion of the New York program. Once the 
legislatures implemented these programs, however, the 
threat of the strike had already passed.90 This prompts the 
tricky question: how much of the increased filming in 
California and New York was due to the end of the Writers 
Guild strike? Despite these analytical difficulties, even a 
crude estimate of the fraction of film productions receiving 
tax credits that would have occurred even without the 
credits would increase accuracy. 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Comparative Advantages of a Film Production Tax 
Credit Program 
States with a historical comparative advantage in film 
production, such as New York or California, should adopt a 
film production tax credit program. The rationale behind this 
recommendation is two-fold. First, when more than forty 
states and even more foreign locales have adopted such tax 
credit programs, a race-to-the-bottom phenomenon occurs 
and even states with a comparative advantage in the 
industry must participate in these programs.91 These states 
and foreign jurisdictions are unlikely to overcome the 
collective action problem and jointly agree to end their tax 
incentive programs. Other states with tax credit programs 
distort the market by reducing the tax cost of filming and 
production in their locales. Thus, to maintain their 
comparative advantage in the film production arena, New 
 
89 See 2008 N.Y. STATE ESFPC REPORT, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing 
the effects on production of a potential writers’ strike). 
90 See id. 
91 See McDonald, supra note 1, at 86. 
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York and California must also continue their tax credit 
programs. This is especially the case when states near New 
York or California have these programs and are easily able 
to benefit from their geographic proximity to popular film 
production locales. For example, after Connecticut 
established its own tax credit program, a large digital design 
firm moved from White Plains, N.Y. to Greenwich, Conn.92 It 
is no more difficult for a film production team to visit 
Greenwich, which is ten miles away from White Plains, and 
so this studio benefits from its geographic proximity to the 
film production occurring in New York while being able to 
benefit from Connecticut’s tax credit program.93 
Second, thankfully for New York and California, because 
of their comparative advantage in film production, tax credit 
programs in those two states can be more efficiently run. 
Since the film industry is already established, entrenched, 
and large in New York and California, there are cluster 
effects, benefits to specialization, and increasing returns to 
scale. The Camoin study describes a “virtuous self-
reinforcing cycle” in which non-eligible productions are 
attracted to New York because of the existing film 
production industry and the specialized services and talent 
are more available as a result.94 Cluster effects exist as well. 
Here, states with a comparative advantage in film 
production draw in types of production that are not eligible 
for the tax credit, but are nevertheless attracted to the state 
because of the existing facilities and expertise that have been 
developed as a result of the production induced by the tax 
credit.95 These clusters also extend to the development of 
physical infrastructure, such as studios, and this 
infrastructure construction can also stimulate the state’s 
 
92 Susan Christopherson & Ned Rightor, The Creative Economy As 
“Big Business”: Evaluating State Strategies to Lure Filmmakers, 29 J. 
PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 336, 346 (2010). 
93 Id. 
94 CAMOIN, supra note 54, at 17. 
95 See, e.g., id. 
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economy.96 In addition to these factors, one wonders whether 
there are increases in productivity because of the sheer 
number of films produced by the industry in New York or 
California. This phenomenon has been documented in the 
economics literature of other industries, which finds that 
worker productivity increases because there is a “learning by 
doing” effect.97 All of these “effects” suggest that the ROI of 
film tax credits is likely higher in a state with a comparative 
advantage in film production. 
As such, the rationale for a film production tax credit in a 
state with a comparative advantage, such as New York or 
California, is very different from that in a state with a non-
existent or nascent film industry. States with a comparative 
advantage in film production should offer tax credits in 
response to the threat resulting from other subsidies.98 As a 
result, their tax credit program design must fit these needs. 
B. Tax Credit Design Evaluation and Suggestions for 
New York and California 
The efficacy and efficiency of the ESFPC and California I 
and II depend upon the design and structure of these film 
tax credit programs. This Part discusses the existing 
programs’ designs and suggests improvements. 
1. Films Eligible for the Program 
The New York and California programs both limit 
eligibility to feature films, TV series, and TV movies, which 
may discourage production of documentaries, news 
programs, reality TV shows, sporting events, commercials, 
 
96 See, e.g., id. 
97 Steven D. Levitt et al., Toward an Understanding of Learning by 
Doing: Evidence from an Automobile Assembly Plant, 121 J. POL. ECON. 
643, 644 (2013). 
98 See Christopherson & Rightor, supra note 92, at 336 (discussing the 
issue from an economic policy perspective). 
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and music videos in the states.99 On one hand, feature films 
and non-reality TV have the largest budgets and can result 
in the most spending in state. Moreover, these productions 
are most likely to require special effects expertise, or other 
specialized expertise likely to exist in New York or 
California. TV shows with multiple seasons are also most 
likely to provide long-term jobs. On the other hand, 
documentaries, reality television shows, and sporting events 
are more location-dependent, and thus more likely to stay in 
New York or California regardless of whether a tax credit is 
offered. Furthermore, New York and California are cultural 
capitals outside of the film industry and inspire more reality 
TV shows and documentaries.100 Similarly, sporting events 
typically occur where the teams in the league are located. As 
such, they are likely less responsive to tax credits, and tax 
credit programs are better off offering credits to programs 
that will respond to incentives. 
In an interesting twist on tax credit design, California 
offers an increased tax credit rate for TV series willing to 
relocate to the state. A relocating TV series in its first season 
in California (that filmed its previous season in another 
state) receives a tax credit five percentage points greater 
than a new TV series or a TV series that relocated to 
California but is in its second year in California.101 This 
would appear to be a fairly effective mechanism for 
encouraging TV productions to move to or return to 
California. Unfortunately, one wonders whether the 
particular regulations promulgated in the California II 
program will encourage tax games. For example, a program 
could lower its tax liability by filming in a nearby state, 
 
99 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23685(b)(15)(A) (West 2010) (defining 
“qualified motion picture”); 2015 N.Y. STATE ESFPC GUIDELINES, supra 
note 18, at 2. See also infra Appendix, Table 1, Eligible Projects section.  
100 See, e.g., Real Housewives of New York City (Bravo television 
broadcast 2008); Real Housewives of Beverly Hills (Bravo television 
broadcast 2010). 
101 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23685(a)(4)(B) (West 2014). 
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returning to California for a season, then returning to the 
nearby state, and then returning to California again. In that 
case, unless anti-abuse rules are developed, that production 
would benefit from the 25% tax credit rate in both California 
filming years, whereas if the program stayed in California 
for three seasons, its effective tax credit rate would be 21.7%. 
California I would not have spawned this abuse because the 
increased 25% credit only applied to films that never filmed 
in California that were moving to California. As a result, this 
Note recommends that the California Film Commission limit 
the 5% uplift for relocation to TV series that have either 
(i) never filmed in California prior to relocation, or (ii) have 
moved filming out of California and are moving back to 
California. A TV series moving out and then back into 
California more than once is likely playing tax games. If the 
Commission wants to allow for more flexibility, it could allow 
applicants to appeal this rule and prove that they are moving 
filming in and out of the state for non-tax purposes (e.g., 
because of plot twists). 
California’s tax credit program also restricts eligible new 
TV series to those with a one-million-dollar budget per 
episode, and each episode must be scripted and at least forty 
minutes long, exclusive of commercials.102 This likely distorts 
the market towards dramas and away from comedies, since 
most comedies are a half-hour long.103 Curiously enough, 
relocating TV series have no episode length requirement, 
meaning that a twenty-two minute sitcom that relocates to 
 
102 CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra note 38, at 3. 
103 See Alyssa Rosenberg, Why Are Dramas An Hour Long and 
Comedies a Half Hour?, THINKPROGRESS (July 16, 2012, 5:07 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/alyssa/2012/07/16/518811/why-are-dramas-an-
hour-long-and-comedies-a-half-hour/ [https://perma.cc/97SH-MBDG]. In 
fact, the Television Academy recently ruled that only half-hour shows are 
eligible for the comedy award at the Emmys, though an hour-long comedy 
series may petition to be considered. ACAD. OF TELEVISION ARTS & SCI., 
2015 PRIMETIME EMMY RULES CHANGES 1 (2015), http://www.emmys.com/ 
sites/default/files/Downloads/2015-whats-new-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5 
GC-SAQH]. 
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California is eligible for the tax credit whereas one filmed in 
California from the start is not.104 This may encourage an 
enterprising comedy producer to choose to film one season of 
a half-hour show out of state in order to take advantage of 
the tax credit in subsequent seasons. 
The rationale for requiring an episode length of forty 
minutes is unclear. Does the California legislature want to 
create a disincentive for the production of comedies, because 
they see dramas as a purer art form, or because they believe 
they are more likely to earn critical acclaim?105 Or did the 
California legislature want more comedies filmed in an hour-
long (inclusive of commercials) format? Or perhaps the 
California legislature did not carefully examine the potential 
market-distorting effects of an episode length requirement 
and believed it to be a reasonable means of attracting more 
expensive productions to California, since a forty-minute 
episode has higher production costs than a twenty-two-
minute episode? If the last is the case, one wonders why the 
minimum one-million-dollar budget to qualify for the tax 
credit, which applies across the board to new and relocating 
TV series, is not sufficiently effective on its own to maintain 
a minimum level of spending in the state. In conclusion, it 
seems bizarre that California would want to shift the market 
away from producing comedies, or would want to encourage 
comedies to film in another state (at least for one season). If 
this is an unintended consequence, the program should be 
amended to strike out the episode length requirement. If this 
is an intended consequence, the California legislature should 
examine whether it is advisable to encourage the production 
 
104 CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra note 38, at 3. 
105 One wonders if there is a “drama” lobby and a “comedy” lobby in 
California. Interestingly enough, bias against comedies is a real concern 
amongst Oscar contenders. See Tim Dirks, Academy Awards Best Picture 
Genre Biases, AMC: FILMSITE (2014), http://www.filmsite.org/best 
pics2.html [https://perma.cc/LR39-C2U8]. 
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of one entertainment form over another, when there is no 
apparent public policy justification for doing so.106 
2. Whether Credits Are Transferable or 
Refundable 
Transferability allows for the recipient of the tax credit to 
sell the credit to another taxpayer. This allows taxpayers 
who do not have a tax liability in the state, or whose tax 
liability is not large enough, to take advantage of the entire 
tax credit.107 If a tax credit is refundable as opposed to 
transferable, the taxpayer need not sell the tax credit to 
another tax payer if he or she is unable to use the tax credit, 
or the entirety of it.108 Instead, the state will issue the 
taxpayer a refund. In the arena of film production tax 
credits, many states allow tax credits to be transferred or 
refunded.109 
 
106 In comparison, there is a more obvious public policy justification 
for the tax credit’s exclusion of sexually explicit films, since many 
taxpayers would likely be displeased if tax incentives were being offered to 
adult film production. California, like most states, does not allow the tax 
credit to apply to sexually explicit material that would fall under Section 
2257 of Title 18 of the United States Code. CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 
2015, supra note 38, at 4; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23685(b)(15)(D) (West 
2014) (providing for exclusions from the definition of “qualified motion 
picture”). 
107 See Thomas W. Giegerich, The Monetization of Business Tax 
Credits, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 709, 799 (2012). 
108 See Jennifer A Zimmerman & Danny Bigel, The Transferability 
and Monetization of State Tax Credits—Part II, 25 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & 
INCENTIVES 20, 21 (2015) (discussing the differences between transferable 
and refundable tax credits). 
109 Transferable film production tax credits even inspired a film 
producer to launch “the Online Incentive Exchange, a new market where 
prospective buyers of transferable tax credits can compare prices and 
complete deals.” Josh Goodman, Tax Breaks for Sale: Transferable Tax 
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Under the California II program, film producers generally 
cannot transfer tax credits; however, there is an exception 
for independent films.110 Independent films may sell their 
tax credits to an unrelated party, subject to the following 
restrictions and requirements: (i) credits cannot be sold to 
more than one party by the tax credit recipient, (ii) the 
purchaser of the tax credit may not resell to another party 
and may only apply the credit against income taxes (and not 
to sales and use taxes), (iii) the independent film producer 
tax credit seller must include the sale of the tax credit as 
taxable income, and (iv) the purchaser of the tax credit must 
report the purchase price of the tax credits.111 In contrast, in 
New York, film producers may not transfer tax credits, but 
they can claim a refund on unused tax credits, which may 
take up to three years to be refunded.112 Specifically, if the 
refund is less than one million dollars, it can be claimed in 
its entirety for that taxable year.113 If the credit is between 
one million and five million dollars, it is claimed over two 
years.114 If the credit is greater than five million dollars, it is 
claimed over three years.115 
Most film producers subject to the California II regime 
are not able to sell their tax credits or apply for a refund if 
they do not have liabilities that make full use of their tax 
credits. This treatment seems reasonable because film 
producers who do not qualify for “independent” status in 
California are either publicly traded or at least 25% owned 
 
110 See CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra note 38, at 3–4. 
111 CAL. FILM COMM’N, CALIFORNIA FILM & TELEVISION TAX CREDIT 
PROGRAM 2.0: FACT SHEET: USING THE TAX CREDITS 2–3 (2015), 
http://www.film.ca.gov/res/docs/FACT%20SHEET-%20%20Using%20the 
%20Tax%20Credits%20June%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK6L-QGJ8] 
[hereinafter CAL. FILM COMM’N, FACT SHEET]. 
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by publicly traded companies.116 In addition, the taxpayer 
can assign tax credits to “one or more affiliates,” defined as 
any corporation that is a member of a commonly controlled 
group.117 These film producers are likely repeat players in 
the film production market, and thus, even if some of their 
films flop, enough of the films produced by the commonly 
controlled group produce income to fully utilize the tax 
credit. Many producers also produce other films or content 
ineligible for tax credits, so credits could also be applied to 
income generated by those ventures. Furthermore, 
comparatively more film production companies may reside in 
California, and are likely to be subject to California state 
taxes, so disallowing transfer or rebates for most film 
producer taxpayers seems reasonable. 
In contrast to refundable tax credits, transferable tax 
credits do not require additional direct government 
expenditures or administration, which reduces the cost of 
implementing the tax credit program and may be more 
palatable to certain political constituency groups.118 
However, transferable tax credits may not be economically 
equivalent to refundable tax credits from the perspective of 
the taxpayer. While there are no publicly available statistics 
for the selling price of one dollar of a film production tax 
credit in California, it is almost certainly less than one 
dollar.119 Buyers are not willing to pay dollar for dollar 
 
116 CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra 39, at 3; CAL. REV. & 
TAX. CODE § 23685(b)(6) (West 2010) (defining “independent film”). 
117 CAL. FILM COMM’N, FACT SHEET, supra note 111, at 1. For example, 
Warner Brothers’ subsidiaries include New Line Cinema and Castle Rock 
Entertainment. If New Line Cinema was unable to utilize its full tax 
credit, it could assign its portion to Warner Brothers or Castle Rock 
Entertainment. 
118 See Clinton G. Wallace, Note, The Case for Tradable Tax Credits, 8 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 227, 271 (2011). 
119 The price of transferable tax credits in a different industry can 
serve as comparison. For example, the market price of Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit reached a high of $0.95 for every $1 of tax credit. Id. 
at 264. 
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because of transaction costs associated with transferring a 
tax credit, including fees to accountants, lawyers, and 
brokers.120 Furthermore, the seller of the tax credit gets cash 
immediately, whereas the buyer must wait for the 
government to issue a tax refund after filing, so buyers must 
be compensated for the time value of money.121 The sale of a 
tax credit is includible in income, which further reduces the 
taxpayer’s economic benefit.122 As such, transferable tax 
credits are not a paragon of efficiency, because the intended 
beneficiary of the tax credit is likely receiving less than a 
dollar per dollar of tax credit, but the tax credit still costs the 
government one dollar of tax revenue. 
Despite these drawbacks to the efficiency of transferable 
tax credits, the state has used them with some success for 
independent film producers. Without allowing transferability 
for independent producers, those producers would likely not 
be incentivized to produce in California because they may 
not generate enough income to fully utilize a tax credit or 
may not be certain that they will have enough income to do 
so. Furthermore, independent producers are less likely to be 
repeat players in the film production market or to be able to 
predict their income because their ventures are riskier. The 
tax credit program should appeal to both big and small 
players for political expediency. Policymakers may even 
want to pay more attention to independent producers 
because they may be even more motivated by budgetary 
 
120 See McDonald, supra note 1, at 110. 
121 Arguably it is economically fair that the seller should have to 
compensate the buyer for this time value of money, since the seller 
receives the money at point of sale. 
122 This is also the point of view the IRS takes with respect to federal 
taxes. The IRS has “maintained a consistent view” that when a taxpayer 
sells a state tax credit to another party, the transaction is to be treated as 
sale of property, with the “seller accordingly recogniz[ing] gain to the 
extent its amount realized exceeds its basis in the credit, and the buyer 
takes a cost basis in the credit.” Adam C. Kobos, Recent Developments in 
the Taxation of Transferable State Tax Credits, CORP. TAX’N, July/Aug. 
2011, at 38, 38. 
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concerns and have a greater willingness to film in other 
nearby states where the cost of location and labor may 
already be cheaper than in California. 
In comparison, New York’s program allows tax credits to 
be refunded, with the refund potentially spread out over 
three years.123 On one hand, the taxpayer-film-producer does 
not need to find a purchaser for the tax credit, thereby 
decreasing transaction costs. On the other hand, the 
taxpayer may have to wait up to three years to obtain the 
entirety of the tax credit. This means that the present value 
of each dollar of tax credit varies depending on how large the 
credit is, which determines the spread of the payments over 
a one-, two-, or three-year period. 
On the whole, allowing for refunds or transfers, or 
disallowing them, has benefits and drawbacks. Compared to 
most other states, New York and California can viably 
disallow refunds or transfers given the high likelihood that a 
film-producing entity needs to pay tax in those states 
because many producers are based in one state or the 
other.124 California II’s general policy of no transfers or 
refunds is possible because of the concentration of film 
production in the state. That being said, independent 
producers should be able to refund or sell their credits; 
otherwise they would not be incentivized to produce in 
California. In New York, only taxpayers who do not have 
enough of a tax liability to take advantage of the full value of 
the credit can take advantage of refunds. As such, small or 
independent producers may be the only ones eligible for a 
credit refund, making the ESFPC not inherently more 
generous than the California policy. Since the tax credit has 
already been enacted, the political cost of direct expenditures 
by the government as opposed to transfers between private 
parties is a moot concern. Therefore, efficiency is the prime 
 
123 N.Y. TAX LAW § 24(a)(2) (McKinney 2016). 
124 See LAO, supra note 50, at 10 fig.3 (illustrating that nearly three-
quarters of all film production jobs in the United States in 2012 were 
located in either California or New York). 
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factor in evaluating whether transferable or refundable tax 
credits are more appropriate, and it is unclear whether the 
transaction costs of transfer or the time-value costs of spread 
out refund payments (unique to New York’s refund design) 
are more acute. As it stands, both refunds and transfers have 
their benefits and drawbacks and there is not a clear winner. 
3. Allocation of Tax Credits 
Both the California and New York programs have 
budgetary caps, which means that potentially not all 
productions eligible will receive a tax credit. In California, 
policymakers have debated tax credit allocation, which they 
were particularly concerned about during the California I 
program due to its smaller budget.125 
The New York program has the most straightforward 
allocation mechanism, which is simply first come, first 
served, based upon “receipt of a complete final 
application.”126 Most rational taxpayers would simply file a 
complete final application at the first moment they were 
eligible to do so, necessitating some tie-breaking mechanism. 
One assumes that because New York’s allocation mechanism 
has not been hotly debated or commented on, perhaps 
scarcity of tax credits is not a significant issue. California 
changed its allocation mechanism from a lottery system to 
one that incentivizes job production. The California I 
program accepted applications on a first come, first serve 
basis, like New York, but also provided for a lottery as a tie-
breaking mechanism. If more than one application was 
received on the same date, a lottery determined the order of 
all applications received on that date.127 While this would 
 
125 See Federal Legislators Urge California to Reauthorize Film Tax 
Credit, ST. TAX TODAY, July 29, 2014, at 1–2, LEXIS, 2014 STT 146-18. 
126 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 5, § 170.5 (2015). 
127 See California Film & Television Tax Credit Program Guidelines, 
CAL. FILM COMM’N 9 (2014), http://www.film.ca.gov/res/docs/pdf/Incentives 
%20Documents/CFCGuidelines%20March%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
F2PF-TKSA] [hereinafter CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2014]. 
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seem fair to taxpayers applying for the credit, it reduces the 
expected value of the tax credit. If a taxpayer-producer 
knows ten taxpayers are applying for credits on that day, 
and there is only room in the budget for two tax credits, then 
his or her expected value from the tax credit would be 20% of 
the value of the tax credit. This makes the tax credit less 
valuable from a net present value perspective, reducing the 
expected rate of return some producers may use to decide 
whether or not to engage in a new film project.  
The California II program replaced the lottery system 
with a “Jobs Ratio” measure. The base jobs ratio is 
determined by adding together qualified wage expenditures 
and 35% of qualified non-wage expenditures, and then 
dividing that total by the amount of tax credits requested. 
The base jobs ratio can be increased via “Bonus Points,” 
which are earned by spending on visual effects,128 principal 
photography days at principal production facilities (in 
relation to days filming in-state but not at a listed facility), 
and principal photography days outside of the “Los Angeles 
Zone.”129 The top 200% of Jobs Ratio ranked projects are 
asked for supporting documentation, and the highest ranked 
projects are then assigned tax credits.130 The Jobs Ratio was 
adopted to “identify those projects which create the most jobs 
and increase economic activity in the state.”131 The Jobs 
Ratio seems like it would be effective at doing so by 
incentivizing film producers to create more jobs, or pay 
higher wages. Granting Bonus Points for filming at a 
principal production facility increases the return of capital 
investments in these facilities. Bonus points for filming 
outside of Los Angeles further incentivize job creation in 
areas of California that are not traditionally filming areas. 
One assumes the California legislature intended these 
 
128 Visual effects are also eligible for a 5% uplift. CAL. FILM COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES 2015, supra note 38, at 10. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 6–9. 
131 Id. at 10. 
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effects. The California allocation method is designed to 
effectuate a race to the top, insofar as creating marginally 
more jobs or paying marginally more wages may yield a tax 
credit that more than compensates for marginal increases to 
production costs. Producers will then try to marginally inch 
out the competition in the Jobs Ratio metric, leading to 
slight upwards pressure on wages and job creation. As such, 
the Jobs Ratio mechanism is a well-designed tax credit 
feature resulting in effects that are in line with government 
intentions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
New York and California currently have robust film 
production tax credit programs that should be continued in 
the future. Economic impact analyses suggest that though 
neither program is truly revenue-neutral for each state’s 
fiscal budget, the return on investment for all fiscal 
authorities in the state is positive. Moreover, New York and 
California’s relatively efficient tax credit programs can thank 
the states’ historic strength in film production, which 
resulted in tight networks of suppliers, for pushing the 
estimated effects of the ripple throughout the economy per 
dollar of tax credit spending over $8 in New York state and 
over $19 in California. These economic impact analyses also 
have their shortcomings: they do not consider the 
opportunity cost to the state of implementing a film 
production tax credit over other fiscal policies, they often use 
the questionable counterfactual “but for the film credit, a 
film producer receiving the credit would film elsewhere,” and 
they often cannot separate out causation from correlation. 
Despite these issues, the generally positive results from 
these studies suggest that film production tax credit 
programs should be continued in states like California and 
New York. 
Going forward, this Note offers a few suggestions as to 
how these programs should be designed, taking into account 
the historical strength of the film industry in both these 
states. When deciding which films are eligible for the tax 
credit, legislators need to be aware of the danger of 
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unintended distortions to the film industry. For example, 
California’s forty-minute television episode length 
requirement encourages the filming of dramas over 
comedies. As with all tax design, there is also a danger of 
encouraging tax games, which California’s definition of a 
relocating television series may do. Additionally, there are 
benefits and drawbacks to allowing recipients to refund or 
transfer the credits, and it does not seem like one is clearly 
more optimal than the other. Lastly, it is unclear why New 
York has not elucidated a tie-breaking mechanism in its 
allocation system, whereas California’s new Jobs Ratio 
system has the benefit of exerting upward pressure on wages 
and job creation. All in all, these film production tax credits 
are necessary to respond to the threat of migrating film 
production as a result of other states’ adopting tax credit 
programs, and thoughtful design can make these programs 
as non-distortive and efficient as possible. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. 
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 40% to New 
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to authorize $800 






$10 million of 
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Up to $25 
million/year may 




Up to $5 million/ 
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132 CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra note 38. Major changes 
to the program relative to California I appear in bold. 
133 CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2014, supra note 127. 
134 2015 N.Y. STATE ESFPC GUIDELINES, supra note 18. 
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(1) Top 200% of 
ranked projects 







then assigned tax 
credits until 
“allocation within 
each category is 
exhausted.”136 
 
(3) Waitlist for 
applicants in the 
top 200% of jobs 
ratios who do not 
receive tax credit 
allocation.137 







based upon date 
applications 








the Director of 
the CFC shall 
determine the 
order of all 
applications 
received on the 
same date.”138 
First-come, first-
served system of 
allocation, based 
upon “receipt of a 
complete final 
application” for 
the ESFPC and 
upon “the date of 
the approval of 
an applicant’s 
final application” 
for the ESFPC. 
 
135 The jobs ratio is intended to identify “projects which create the 
most jobs and increase economic activity,” as determined by “qualified 
wages and qualified non-wage expenditures” as well as “bonus points” for 
expenses such as visual effects. CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra 
note 38, at 10. “To determine the jobs ratio of each project, 35% of the non-
wage expenditures are automatically added to the qualified wage amount, 
which is then divided by the amount of tax credits requested.” Id. 
136 Jobs Ratio Calculation and Ranking, CAL. FILM COMM’N, 
http://www.film.ca.gov/CFC%20Tax%20Credit%20Job%20Ratio%20Ranki
ng.htm [https://perma.cc/EAP2-LCRR]. 
137 CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra note 38, at 9. 
138 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 5501(b) (2009). 
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meet the follow-
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to first $100 
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documentaries, 













(a) If production 
budget is over 
$15 million OR 
film is being 
produced by a 
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more than 5% 
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(b) If production 
budget is less 
than $15 million 





must shoot min. 1 
day of principal 
photography at a 
QPF. 
(c) If a pilot, then 
must shoot min. 1 
day of principal 
photography at a 
QPF AND 75% of 
all production 
expenses at all 
facilities utilized 
must be related 
to filming at 
QPF. 
(d) If more than 
one production 
 
139 Principal photography does not include filming of primarily 
backgrounds, visual effects, action and/or crowd scenes by the second, 
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wholly in Cal. 
OR (b) 75% of 
production 
budget must be 
used for goods, 
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meet 75% test  
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facility used, then 
75% of all 
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QPF. 
 






(a) Visual FX and 
animation costs 
incurred at a 
qualified post-
production 
facility in NYS 
are min. 20% 
total such costs 
OR min. $3 
million dollars 
OR (b) qualified 
post-production 
costs incurred at 
post-production 
facilities in NYS 
make up min. 




stunt or visual effects units. CAL. FILM COMM’N, GUIDELINES 2015, supra 
note 38, at 3. 
140 2015 N.Y. STATE ESFPC GUIDELINES, supra note 18, at 3. 
XU – FINAL 
470 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 









Must be incurred 
in Cal.; services 
must be per-
formed in Cal.; 
purchases and 
rentals must be 
made and used in 
Cal.  
 













Must be incurred 
in Cal.; services 
must be per-
formed in Cal.; 
purchases and 
rentals must be 
















(1) If 75% test 
met (min. 75% of 
costs at QPF, if 
more than one 
facility used), one 
may also qualify 
for credit based 
upon qualified 
expenditures141 
outside QPF that 





subject to the 
following 
requirements: 
(a) if production 
spends <$3 
million on all 
costs related to 
 
141 Qualified production costs are “tangible property or services used 
or performed within NYS directly and predominantly in the production of 
a qualified film.” They generally include below-the-line expenses and 
excludes above-the-line expenses. 2015 N.Y. STATE ESFPC GUIDELINES, 
supra note 18, at 5. Qualified post-production costs are those “associated 
with the production of original content for a qualified film employing 
traditional, emerging and new workflow techniques used in post-
production for picture, sound, and music editorial, re-recording and 
mixing, visual effects, graphic design, original scoring, animation, and 
musical composition; but shall not include the editing of previously 
produced content for a qualified film.” Only work done in NYS is included. 
Id. at 6. 
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production costs 
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142 The eligible counties are: Allegany, Broome, Cattaraugus, Cayuga, 
Chautauqua, Chemung, Chenango, Clinton, Cortland, Delaware, Erie, 
Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Genesee, Hamilton, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, 
Livingston, Madison, Monroe, Montgomery, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, 
Ontario, Orleans, Oswego, Otsego, Schoharie, Schuyler, Seneca, St. 
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(3) qualified wage 
and non-wage 
expenditures out-
















Refunds None. None. Available.  
 
If an applicant’s 
approved amount 
of credits exceeds 
the max. amount 
of credits for a 
given year, that 
applicant’s credit 
will be allocated 
on a priority 
basis the next 
year.143 The 
credit can be 
claimed in the 
later of (1) the 
year the taxable 
year production 
is complete or (2) 
the taxable year 
 
Lawrence, Steuben, Tioga, Tompkins, Wayne, Wyoming, and Yates. Id. at 
2. 
143 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 5, §§ 170.1, 230.5 (2014). 
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refund. If refund 
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entirety. If credit 
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side the LA zone. 
None. 5–10% increase 









144 N.Y. EMPIRE ST. DEV., FILM TAX CREDIT PROGRAM GUIDELINES: 
APPLICATION PROCESS—STEPS TO THE CREDIT 2 (2014), http://esd.ny.gov/ 
businessprograms/Data/Film/2014/StepstoCreditMAY2014.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/64J5-69LN]. 
145 N.Y. TAX LAW § 24(a)(2) (McKinney 2016). 
